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PRESIDENT'S NOTES
Most military officers like to refer to
themselves and to their occupation in
terms of "professionalism." They like to
consider themselves experts in a field
that, according to one definition of
professional, demands "advanced study
in a specialized field." Indeed, the
raison d'etre of the Naval War College is
the professional development of of
ficers. This is, as any true professional
will recognize, far too narrow a defini
tion-although advanced and continuing
study throughout one's career is essen
tial to professionalism.
In the broadest sense, profes
sionalism requires a high degree of skill
and competence, but, more than that,
professionalism is a state of mind which
demands of those who would be called
professionals the highest ethical stand·
ards and morally responsible pattern of
conduct.
In the history of the Navy, profes·
sionalism has been manifested in many
different ways-none, however, more
unique or ennobling than the per
formance of our prisoners of war in
North Vietnam.
One of the best expressions of how
an organization can be enriched by the
efforts of a few is to be found in the
conduct of Comdr. Robert Naughton
during his 6-year confinement in enemy
hands. His was an extraordinarily pro·

fessional response in a perilous situ·
ation-a response that came largely from
within, but one that was also influenced
by his sense of responsibility to the
organization of which he was a part.
Commander Na ugh ton and his fellow
prisoners have, in this issue of the
Review, given us an example of which
we can all be proud.
lf we are to refer to ourselves as
professionals, we must, each and every
one of us, perform to a high profes
sional standard in this larger definition
of the word. These ideas of competence
and personal commitment are certainly
not new. Professor Gibbs' fine paper
also in this Review-reflects Clausewitz's
understanding of these ideas. Today,
however, they take on special signifi
cance. The American people no longer
take for granted the performance of any
of the professions, including the mili
tary. The responsibility of professionals
to their organization in this context is
crystal clear.
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Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
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Throughout the years of poUtlCal dissonance created by the Vietnam war1 the one
element tI1at could command aJmost universal support in the United States was
concern for our prisoners of war. Through an unswerving loyalty to themselves, their
fellow prisoners, and to tlrn Nation as a who}e, these men 1 confined, torwred 1 and
used for poJitical propaganda, were able to teturn llome with a11 honor and dignity
often lost by men in similar circumstances, (This article represents an abridged
version of an extensive researc11 effort conducted by the author.)

MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS OF
AMERICAN PRISIONERS OF WAR
HELD BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
An article prepared
hy
Commaruler ltoherl

J.

Naughton, U.S. Navy

Introduction, January 1973 wit•
genuine show of interest and concern
for utheir" POW's,
nessed the end of the longest continual
The Vietnam POW's, however, were
armed conflict in the 200,year history
of the United States. Sixty days after
not the first prisoners of war who had
the signing of the Paris agreement1 the
received publicity. Those American men
who had been held prisoners in all
longest recorded incarceration of Ameri·
can prisoners of war (POW's) ended for
recent wars have been the subject of
public examination, and their return to
more than 500 men1 over 450 of whom
the United States has provided a great
had been held in the Democratic Repu b
deal of human interest news copy.
lic of Vietnam (DRV). Several of these
men had endured more than 8 years as
The post-Korean period was the most
prisoners of the DRV, while one POW
lucid example of such investigation.
Eugene Kinkead 's widely read book, In
held by the Vie !Cong was detained over
Every War But One, based on
9 years.
The POW's received a warm and
tumultuous welcome from the people of
The source material for this article is
drawn £ram the author's 6 years of imprison·
the United States. This served to create
ment in the Democrallc Republic of Vietnam
a unanimity among Americans which
•-his experience and observations plus the
had been lacking during the long years
narratives and reCTeclions of 118 other pris
1
of the Vietnam conflict. The Nation s
oners with whom he, at various times, shared
a cell.
public display of pride and relief was a
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol28/iss1/17
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CLAUSEWITZ

Ciausewitz 1.'i dictum that uwar is an
extension of policy by other mea!ls u has
become an artjcJe of faith for the
military professional. While this concept
provides a much needed theoretical
framework for understanding and deal·
ing with the phenome11on, his discussion
on the moral (psychological) forces pro
vides an equally illuminating insight into
the dynamics of war.

ON THE
MORAL FORCES
IN WAR

An article prepared
by
llr. Norman II. Gibbs
Clausewitz was deeply concerned
with why men fight, what it is that
makes wars emerge and develop as they
do 1 and what general factors contribute
to victory and defeat. However, the
writing and discussion about Clause•
witz 's book On War which have taken
place during the past 30 years or so have
concentrated largely on his argument
that "war is an extension of policy by
other means. 0 It is undoubtedly an
argument basic to his whole concept of
the nature of wars that actually occur as
distinct from any theoretical concept of
war: or, to use his own words, it is an
argument which helps explain the con·
trast between real war on the one hand
and absolute or ideal war on the other.
But the view of war as an extension of
policy was no discovery of Clausewitz,
as I think he would have been the first
to admit. We do him an injustice by
stopping at that point. I believe that he
has something equally significant to say

about the importance of the moral
forces in war.
This is one of those points at which
Clausewitz goes in a new direction in
which he is concerned with the impor
tance of the concept of ideology in war.
But first a proviso. I think w e have a
tendency to be overly narrow in our use
of the word "ideology H and, therefore,
reduce its usefulness for our purpose.
Ideologies are not just politica\ creeds.
To be of full value in the analysis of
warfare, or indeed any other part of
social analysis, ideology should be seen
as something more comprehensive than
simply political doctrine; something
which, operating in the hearts and
minds of men, moves them and inspires
them to action. Of course, it is true that
"something" can often be identified
with political doctrine and that such
An adaptation of a lecture delivered at the
Naval War CoUege,
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In their studies of Woodrov1 Wilson and the First World War, most historians have
assumed that the near•pacifist Wilson had little appreciation for the concept of force

as an extension of diplomacy, On more careful investigation, however, it becomes
apparent that Wilson not only developed realistic and clearly articulated war goals

but that he was able to coordinate his larger diplomatk purpose with the use of force

perhaps better than any war President before or since,

WOODROW WILSON AND THE RECONCILIATION
OF FORCE AND DIPLOMACY: 1917-1918
A lecture given al thi, Naval War College

by
l'rofessor ll.F. Trask
Wilson, specifical!y, and the U.S. Gov•
The questions most frequently ad•
ernment1 in general, paid scant attention
dressed by historians in their study of
to this question. It is certainly true that
American foreign policy during World
Wilson gave less time to day-to-day
War 1 normally concern either why the
operations than perhaps any other war
United States entered the war or why
time President; but if ever an American
she ultimately rejected the postwar
settlement, These questions lead schol•
President put into practice the famous
ars primarily to the study of neutrality
Clausewitzian dictum that warfare
should be conducted to achieve funda
from August 1914 to April 1917 and to
mental political purposes, it was Wood·
an examination of peacemaking from
row Wilson. This notion of Wilson being
November 1918 to March 1920. Un·
a grand strategist par excellence is a
fortunately, the period of actual combat
direct contradiction to the generally
has, until recently, been al! but ne·
held image of Wilson as a lofty and
glected.
One significant aspect of belligerency
impractical idealist who knew little and
cared less about the real world. Never
that has never been thoroughly ex·
amined is the process by which Presi
theless, although the evidence supports
the proposition that he was a profound
dent Wilson sought to apply the military
idealist with high hopes for his country
and naval power of the United States in
and for mankind 1 it also establishes
the service of larger political purposes
Wilson as an example of the fact that
during 1917-1918. Indeed, most his·
torians seem to have assumed that
realism and idealism often coexist in the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1975
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Soviet policy in the Middle East-aompliaated1 expensive, and often frustrating�

met per!iaps its greatest setback on 18 July 1972 w!wn Egyptian President Anwar
Sadat announced the termination of the mis.don of tlw Soviet military advisers and

experts in Egypt. Undaunted fiowever, Kremlin planners continued to pursue their
goal of an "anti-imperialist" Arab union dependent on Russian arms and amenable to
Russian influence, The Yorn Kippur war of 1973 apparently rewarded their efforts
with success, but the long-sought prize of Arab sympathy was taken, if only
temporarily, by their archival, the United States, via the diploma tic efforts of Henry

Kissinger.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST
FROM THE EXODUS OF 1972
TO THE YOM KIPPUR WAR
An article prepared
by
Dr. Robert 0. Frnedman
Introduction. Since their 1955 arms
deal with Egypt, Soviet policymakers
have sought to establish the Soviet
Union as the dominant power in the
Middle East. The main thrust of this
strategy has been simply to replace the
Western Powers in their former posi�
tions of political, military r and eco
nomic influence within the region. The
Soviet leaders have engaged in massive
economic aid projects such as the
Aswan and Euphrates Dams; they have
contributed large amounts of sophisti
cated military equipment to many of
the states of the region; and more
recently they have sought to consolidate
their influence through long-term
''Friendship and Assistance" treaties
such as the ones signed with Egypt in
l 971 and Iraq in l 972.
Yet1 as the expulsion of the Soviet
military forces from Egypt in 1972
indicated, with or without treaties,
Kremlin influence in the highly volatile

Middle East remains quite limited.
Soviet efforts have been plagued by the
numerous interstate and intrastate con
flicts common to Arab politics, by the
incessant competition for leadership
within the Arab bloc of nations-Egypt,
Syria, traq1 Libya, and Saudi Arabia and by the problem of defining a proper
role for the Communist Parties of the
Middle East. Illegal in a number of Arab
countries and viewed vrith suspicion in
all of them, the Communist Parties have
embarrassed the Russians on a number
of oocasions. Most recently, Russian
support for the Sudanese Communist
Party in the abortive coup attempt
against Sudanese President Ja'afar
Nimeri in July 1971-an attempt which
resulted in the decimation of the Suda
nese Communist P arty's leadership-all
but ended Soviet-Sudan ese relations.
Finally, the Russians have had to
cope wi th competition from the United
States and Communist China which
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That a vital interest of both the United States and the industrial West lies in free
access to the Middle Eastern oil supply has been made abundantly clear by the
embargo and s ubsequent increases in the price of oil. Threats to this vital interest
range from Soviet adventurism to the inherent domestic instabilities of the region. A
firm and mutually profitable relationship with Iran, perhaps the most militarily
potent and politically stable state in the region, seems to be the best policy against
realization of these threats.

IRAN AND AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
An article prnpared
by
Major Uard E. O'Neill, U.S. Air Force
and
Captain Paul R. Viotti, U.S. Air Force
Introduction. In October 1973 the
Organization of Arab Petroleum Ex
porting Countries (OAPEC) sent shock
waves through the industrialized world
when it decreased the overall produc
tion of oil and embargoed the United
States, Portugal, South Africa, and the
Netherlands. The impact of these de
velopments and a subsequent quantum
rise in oil prices for the Western states
and Japan was immediate and far reach
ing. On both sides of the Atlantic and in
Tokyo there were fears of recession and
even depression, the possibility of mil
lions unemployed, and of massive defi
cits in the balance of payments.
Although in the ensuing months the
experts debated the magnitude of the
cutback, the behavior of the indus
trialized states suggested that they con
sidered the threats both real and serious.
Besides turning their attention to

conservation measures and the develop
ment of domestic oil and other energy
resources, the developed nations began a
search for long-term external petroleum
supplies at reasonable prices. In their
scramble to obtain Middle Eastern oil,
the European countries and Japan
moved quickly to endorse the Arab
demand that the Israelis withdraw from
all of the territories occupied in the
June 1967 Middle Eastern war, actions
which reflected the extreme depend
ency of Japan (over 90 percent) and
Europe (over 70 percent) on external
sources of oil. Such a course of action
was judged unacceptable by the United
States which instead stressed active and
intensive diplomacy as the best means
to deal with the oil problem. The more
moderate reaction on Washington's part
was, of course, related to the fact that
America was far less dependent on
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The fact that management has virtu•

INFORMATION

to ignore the cost of in
formation highlights the need for an
awareness of informational practices

ally chosen

and their respective costs. Such an
awareness can lead to culling out 11might

COST

need, nice to have" information and is

essential to combat the development of
those internal and external power bases

that are detrimental to both the eco

AWARENESS

nomic and general health of the

zationa.l whole.

organi

A research l'"I'"' prepared in the
l)cfcnse Economies and l )ccisionmaking Course
al llic Naval Wm· College

by
Lieutenant Colonel Donald R, Miller, IJ,S. Marine Corps

Although the seed for this paper was

sown early in the Defense Economics
and Decisionmaking course taught at
the Naval War College, it could have as

easily been planted in any management
curriculum where the need for informa·
tion is repeatedly stressed. Lectures on
decisionmaking procedures, courses in
ana,ytical methods, and case study dis·
cussions atl drive one point home: in
formation is invaluable. It is required to
observe trends, develop statistical bases,
conduct day-to-day operations, and re·
duce the uncertainty from plans. How·
ever, a curious thing develops during
such courses: there is virtually no men•
lion of the cost of information, It is as
if information were a free and readily
attainable commodity, available for the
asking. Traditional economic theories
on supply and demand, production, et
cetera, evidently are not applicable to

information. Similarly, although infor
mation is an essential element in a
cost/benefit analysis, managers have
apparently found it convenient to give
the problem less than full attention.
Nevertheless, the collection, trans·
mission, storage, processing, and distri
bution of information obviously do
have a hard dollar cost. In a personal
sense this can be observed in outlays for
newspapers, books 1 magazines, tele
vision sets, tetephones, and education.
Organizational activities rapidly extend
this list by additional outlays for sophis·
ticated communication and electronic
processing equipmen t 1 special forms and
reports, and staffs devoted to various
aspects of the information process. The
epitome of the situation probably rests
with our bureaucratic Government
where countless number of forms and
reports alone cost the Nation billions of
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